The Second Scramble for Africa\u27s Oil and Mineral Resources: Blessing or Curse by Okeke, Chris Nwachukwu
The Second Scramble for Africa's Oil and
Mineral Resources: Blessing or Curse?
CHRIS NWACHUKWU OKEKE*
This article, while critically examining the second wave of the scramble for oil and mineral
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ments, to be involved. Historically, the scramble for Africa's economic resources by the Euro-
pean countries that began in colonial times never ceased as such, even with decolonization,
owing to the continent's strategic resource richness. What appears to be new in the current
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of the resources by some non-European nations, in particular America and some Asian coun-
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most important reasons for the current wave of second scramble for oil and mineral resources
of Africa are: strategic location, lack of obstacles for transportation of its oil, quality of oil, less
complicated contractual conditions, and non-membership of OPEC by many of the oil-produc-
ing countries in the continent. The heart of the problem of this scramble lies in the fact that
while the resource exploration and exploitation by all stakeholders could be beneficial to the
people if properly done, the scourges of corruption, environmental degradation, and human
rights abuses have taken the upper hand. This being so, this paper further advocates a solution
ensuring democratic accountability, reform of the constitutions for more respect for private
property rights over natural resources, and finally, reform of the judiciary to provide more
access to individuals and groups seeking to enforce their fundamental human rights. The
article also rebuts the sharp criticism in some quarters that the proposed remedies contained
herein are still not achievable even with great political will demonstrated by the governments
of African countries.
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I. Introduction: Nature of the Problem
Matters surrounding the second scramble for Africa's oil and mineral resources consti-
tute very topical legal and economic questions of the 21st century) In discussing this
subject, it is useful to address a vital preliminary question: what are the distinguishing key
characteristics between the first scramble for Africa and the contemporary economic activ-
ities recently taking place on the continent? Historically, Africa is well known for its
strategic resource riches. For ages, European countries have competed for the control of
Africa's resources. The modern oil craze has accentuated that rivalry and scramble for
Africa's oil. What may be new in this regard is the entry of Asian and other new nations
in the keen competition.
An important element of the first scramble for Africa was its European government-
driven nature, resulting from the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference on Africa. There, the
West-European powers laid down the rules for dividing up Africa by establishing the prin-
ciple of "effective occupation" in order to claim territories in Africa. Subsequently, this
principle was followed by the great inroad into the interior parts of the continent demon-
strating the two forms of arrogance for which the West is now very well known-military
and cultural. The European nations also demonstrated a total disregard for African gov-
ernments and their people during this move.2 Without question, the first scramble was
more beneficial to the European countries than to Africa, its governments, and people.
The major characteristic of the second scramble for Africa is that it is more private
sector-driven than foreign government-driven, although foreign governments frequently
hide behind private companies owned by their nationals. According to a recent author,
the contemporary method of scramble for Africa's resources is mainly two-fold: (1) the
underground scramble for the continent's mineral wealth, and (2) the white collar scram-
ble for Africa's state-owned economic and organizational outfits (e.g., corporations, facto-
ries, concerns, services, etc). 3 Just like the first scramble, the second scramble is clearly
more beneficial to the main actors-that is, the private foreign corporations and their
home governments-than to African governments and people.
As the industrial and emerging industrial powers race to extract Africa's natural re-
sources to feed their own consumption, important questions regarding human rights
abuses, environmental degradation and corruption arise and should be critically reexam-
ined. 4 The issues raised by this contemporary conduct represent a complex and under-
analyzed area of international law.
1. Within the last two and half decades, numerous scholarly publications have continued to appear on
the subject, each taking a position based on several theories for and against the new trend as it affects the
people of the continent of Africa both economically and socially.
2. Excuses were the colonial glory of conquest and the so-called white man's burden to rescue the world
from them.
3. Rudolf Ogoo Okonkwo, The Second Scramble for Africa, http://www.edofolks.com/html/publ59.htm
(last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
4. For a recent comprehensive and incisive discussion of this subject, see Ndiva Kofele-Kale, TIE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC CRIMES: HOLDING STATE OFFICIALS INDIVIDUALLY
LIABLE FOR ACTS OF FRAUDULENT ENRICHMENT (2006).
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II. The Second Scramble
Evidence of increasing interest in Africa, especially in the areas of trade and investment,
is mounting. This increase of interest, which was ironically long-dominated by the West,
is slowly but successfully being edged out by emerging economies.5 For some time, the
West upheld the policy of supporting and maintaining kleptocrats like Zaire's Mobutu
Sesse Seko,6 the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos, Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu, Haiti's
Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier, Shah of Iran, Stroessner of Paraguay, Teodoro Obiang
Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, and Sani Abacha of Nigeria, all of whom emptied the
national treasuries of their respective people yet were granted safe havens in Europe and
America to live out their remaining years in luxury. Suddenly, the same Western coun-
tries succeeded in convincing the African governments and intelligentsia that African
emerging democracies could not run their own economic affairs. Through the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), in which Western countries have absolute
control, liberalization of the economies of developing countries was introduced, which
basically meant the devolution of economic control from the government to the private
sector. The West introduced stringent conditionalities in economic cooperation among
nations in order to realize their objective. 7 The question of Western imposition of certain
conditionality on developing countries between the promotion of human rights and envi-
ronmental protection on the one hand and cooperation in trade and development on the
other has remained a controversial issue in contemporary international economic rela-
tions.8 For example, the first defensive statement ever made collectively by Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with regard to the protection of basic human rights
was contained in their communiqu6 of July 21-22, 1992. 9 The ASEAN Ministerial posi-
tion on this stated:
The Foreign Ministers maintained that environmental and human rights concerns
should not be made conditionalities in economic and development cooperation. They
noted that basic human rights, while universal in character, are governed by distinct
culture and history of the socio-economic conditions in each country and that their
expression and application in the national context are within the competence and re-
sponsibility of each country.10
Furthermore, ASEAN consistently considered the right to development as an inherent
human right and the right to the environment as a collective human right. According to
5. See Allan Ngugi, Second Scramble for Africa, http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200707090967 (last
visited Aug. 1,2007). New comers like China, South Korea, Russia, Brazil, Malaysia, India, Turkey, and Thai-
land have taken the continent by storm.
6. See Okonkwo, supra note 4.
7. Conditionalities in economic cooperation from an African standpoint are only one of such in-depth
studies relevant to the present topic.
8. Paragraph 18 of the Joint Communiqu6 of the Twenty-Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Ma-
nila on July 21-22, 1992, is evidence of the strong position of an important Asian regional organization of
States on the question of conditionality. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Communique 25th
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, Phillipines, Jul. 21-22, 1992, http://www.aseansec.org/1l67.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2008).
9. Id.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
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Sompong Sucharitkul, "together the two concepts could be combined in the expression:
'the right to sustainable development as a human right. '
As the African nations sought aid packages and debt forgiveness,12 the IMF and World
Bank applied pressure on these African governments to privatize government companies
with Western strategic partners placed in charge of affairs. 13 The World Bank and the
IMF exercise dominant power over economic management in Africa. This is possible
because of the vast resources they control, their monopoly of information, and their supe-
rior scientific authority. Above all, they constitute the gateway to northern support. As a
late Nigerian scholar correcdy stated: "By all indications, the Bretton Woods institutions
have unfortunately come to symbolize power without responsibility."14
It is important to discuss, even if briefly, a few selected leading participants in the cur-
rent scramble for Africa's oil and mineral resources. In doing so, any observed differences
of techniques or methods used by the scrambling countries that make them more accept-
able than others shall be examined and highlighted.
m. The Leading National Actors in the Scramble
A. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The question has been raised whether Africa measures up to the hype?' 5 Perhaps, the
following factual data and recent actions by the United States will shed clear light on the
importance it attaches to this issue. Since 1990, the petroleum industry has invested more
than $20 billion in exploration and production activity in Africa.' 6 It is projected that $50
billion will be spent between now and the end of the decade. This is the largest invest-
ment in the continent's history, and around one-third of it will come from the United
States.' 7 Three of the world's largest oil companies-the British-Dutch consortium Shell,
France's Total, and America's Chevron-are spending 15 percent, 30 percent and 35 per-
cent, respectively, of their global exploration and production budgets in Africa. 18
The American authorities have shown remarkable and consistent interest in Africa's
growing significance as an oil-producing region since the headline discoveries of the late
1990s. The conclusions of several other American reports on this matter pointed to the
11. See Sompong Sucharitkul, Conditionalities in Economic Cooperation: An Asean Perspective (forming part of
studies of ASEAN undertaken by the Center for Advanced International Legal Studies of Golden Gate Uni-
versity School of Law since 1990) (on file with author).
12. For a detailed discussion of the question of debt burden examined from an African perspective, see
Chris N. Okeke, The Debt Burden from an African Perspective, 35 IN'T'L LAW. 1489 (2001).
13. Id. Okonkwo argues, and rightly so, that the strategy of using partners to provide locally lacking
technical, managerial, and financial resources required to turn around the failed government agencies are
obtained, at what he described, as "bargain basement prices." Okonkwo, supra note 4.
14. See CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENTr IN AFRICA 122 (199).
15. JOHN GHAzuiNtz, UNAPED: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA'S OIL 9 (2007).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The main drilling activity has taken place in the so-called "deep water" and "ultra deep" of the Gulf
of Guinea, whose littoral zone passes through the territorial waters of a dozen countries from Ivory Coast in
the northwest down to Angola in the south; a good deal of its geology shares the characteristics that have
made Nigeria a prolific producer for years. Id.
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growing importance of Africa in oil production.' 9 Two notable technocrats in President
Bill Clinton's administration eloquently spelled out the general U.S. economic interests in
Africa. In 1996, Ron Brown, then Commerce Secretary, told business groups in Accra,
Ghana that "from now on, the U.S. is not going to give way on African markets to the old
colonial powers."20 The U.S. Commerce Department described Africa as the "last fron-
tier for American businesses." 2' Moreover, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
described U.S. policy toward Africa as that of "promoting self-help through capitalism." 22
It is very clear that since 1990, many prominent lawmakers in Washington have become
convinced about the possibility of shifting some of America's dependence from the Middle
East to Africa. 23 Many U.S. officials now strongly believe that it is a great risk for the
western world to rely on two or three hot spots for its energy security because of supply
disruptions and price volatility.24 Since September 11, 2001, the distribution of America's
energy-security portfolio has become even more urgent and pressing. It was not surpris-
ing, therefore, when President Bush stated in the January 2006 State of the Union address
that he wanted to reduce America's dependence on Middle East crude by 75 percent.
And even more reecently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill titled "No Oil
Production and Exporting Cartels Act 2007 (NOPEC)." The bill, as the full title and
acronym gratingly blare, takes on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), whose activities it seeks to outlaw. The bill has now moved to the U.S. Senate
for consideration and adoption. All the above goes to show the seriousness and aggres-
siveness of the U.S. government toward the critical issue of energy security.
B. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
The next important actor after the United States in the present struggle for the ex-
ploitation of Africa's oil and other mineral resources is the People's Republic of China.
The Chinese government and politicians, just like their American counterparts, never hid
their interest in identifying the African continent as an important strategic region for its
energy security.25 Indeed, China declared energy security as one of the most important
goals of its foreign policy. 26 This official foreign policy stance is understandable because
19. A fairly secretive May 2001 energy task force report put together by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney
declared that "West Africa is expected to be one of the fastest-growing sources ofoil and gas for the American
market." GHAZTINIAN, supra note 16, at 8. A group of congressmen, lobbyists, and defense strategists under
the umbrella of the African Oil Policy Initiative Group preached the message that the Gulf of Guinea was the
new Persian Gulf and that it should become a strategic priority of the United States, even to the point of
requiring an expanded military presence. This was soon followed by the 2005 reports of the influential Center
for Strategic and International Studies stating that "an exceptional mix of U.S. interests is at play in West
Africa's Gulf of Guinea." Id. at 8-9.





23. See GHAZUrNIAN, supra note 15, at 9.
24. Id.
25. though Africa is comprised by several states of immense diversity, it appears as one country composed
of different units in dealing with China, whose population exceeds that of the entire African continent by
about 400 million people. See GHAZUIIAN, supra note 16.
26. Id. at 275.
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it is hard to imagine a real separation of the government from the corporate business
entities under the Chinese political and economic systems.
One remarkable difference that must be noted when comparing the way the Chinese
came into Africa with the way America and the other western European countries did is
that China did not view itself as superior but rather as a partner. Accordingly, China has
successfully launched corporate partnerships with African governments. It has also pro-
moted significant direct foreign investments. 27
Chinese trade, economic and technological activities in Africa are vast. For example,
China is constructing a new railway in Nigeria, building a new port in Gabon, and has
paved roads in Rwanda. China's bilateral trade with Angola jumped 113 percent in 2004
to $4.9 billion.28 The overall Chinese trade with Africa between 2000 and 2005 is esti-
mated at $50 billion, and is expected to hit $100 billion by 2010.29 Also, China has for-
given virtually billions of dollars of bilateral debt from African countries and has set up
scholarships allowing some 10,000 African students to be educated in China. By doing
these, China has adopted a long-term approach. Unlike Shell BP or Exxon Mobil, China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is strongly supported by the state.
The Chinese played an important role during the formation of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment in the late 1950s following the successful 1955 Bandung Conference that established
that organization. The goal was to unite the developing countries in such a way that they
adopted a neutral position in the Cold War between the then two super powers of the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 30 Recently, China decided to
use the networks it built on the African continent during the Cold War years to a great
advantage. On April 23, 2005, the fiftieth anniversary of Bandung, China launched its
New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP).31
Perhaps the most important demonstration of China's renewed commitment to Africa
was the recent Beijing China-Africa Summit organized by China-Africa Cooperation Fo-
rum (CACF) held on November 4, 2006. This produced a high level dialogue and was the
second conference of Chinese and African entrepreneurs at the Great Hall of the Chinese
People. According to the state-controlled China Central Television International
(CCTV), forty-one African Heads of State and forty-eight Heads of Government were
present in Beijing for the summit, along with hundreds of trade negotiators and business
people. 32 According to the hosts of the summit, the event was described as the largest and
27. According to Ghazvinian, the strategy of the Chinese by and large "has been to offer sizable induce-
ments in the form of cash loans or development projects, which in stark contrast to Western forms of debt
relief-come with no strings attached, no endless sermonizing about fiscal responsibility, and no micromanag-
ing of government spending." Id. at 276.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Though the Non-Aligned Movement is not very active or relevant today, the Chinese keep reaping
from their human investments in Africa between the 1950s and 1970s, when they sent thousands of Chinese
doctors to Africa and offered scholarships to thousands of African students
31. This is a bigger body than the China-African Corporation Forum (CACF) set up in 2000 to promote
trade and investment with forty-four African countries.
32. See Chippla Vandu, On China Africa Summit, NEw BLACK MAGAZINE (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://
www.thenewblackmagazine.com/view.aspx?index=482; see also Mandy Turner, Scramble for Africa, GUARDIAN
(May 2, 2007), http://royaldutchshellplc.com/2007/05/02/the-guardian-society-environment-scramble-for-
africa/.
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most high-level gathering of world's leaders in Beijing since the founding of the People's
Republic in 1949. 33 The Beijing meeting surpassed past meetings of Britain, France, and
the United States on both scale and ambition. One million Chinese citizens were mobil-
ized to provide security, transportation, and entertainment. In terms of propaganda ef-
fect, there is no doubt that the summit catapulted China to greater fame in world affairs.
China's involvement in Africa has received negative criticism from various sectors of the
international community. The strongest of those criticisms is in regard to Chinese busi-
ness and trade relations with a country like Sudan whose actions in the southern part of
Darfur left a bad taste in the mouth of many people in the world. Human rights concerns
top the chart in light of the massive numbers of people that have either died or lost their
homes following the civil war in the country.
IV. Other Important National Actors
Apart from the United States and the People's Republic of China, other countries join-
ing the struggle for Africa's economic resources have included France, Britain, India, Rus-
sia, South Korea, Turkey, Brazil, Malaysia and Australia. The misfortune surrounding the
surge of companies from these countries into the oil-producing nations of Africa is the
decline of the standard of living of Africans even though their neighbors with fewer re-
sources appear to be prospering. This may be due to the fact that the volume of foreign
investment by these countries in the petroleum sector Africa has significantly increased.
What is doubtful is how much of the investment benefits the ordinary citizens in terms of
job opportunities and social benefits. Most of the capital investment in oil industry goes
to the operation and servicing of modem oil equipment because of the capital- intensive
nature of oil business. Clearly, oil exploitation is less labor-intensive. 34 Accordingly, little
of the proceeds from the oil wealth eventually get to the majority of the people who need
help most.
V. Why the Craze for Africa's Oil?
Why do so many influential people in Washington, London, Paris and Beijing get so
carried away when they talk about African oil? Does it depend on the number of barrels
either harvested or that may or may not be buried under the rock or sea? Where lies
Africa's significance as an oil player? 35 If the answers to these questions have nothing to
do with geology, then what other factors best illustrate the true story of this new opportu-
nity in the Euro-American and Asian rush for Africa's resource wealth in the 21st century?
The answer to some of the above-stated questions can be found in the following seven
factors: 1) Africa's strategic geographical location, 2) the ease of transportation, 3) the
quality of Africa's oil, 4) an enabling legal environment, 5) non-membership in OPEC, 6)
off-shore exploration, and 7) the huge and unexplored resource deposit.
33. The Heads of State, alone, represented a quarter of the votes at the United Nations. The people that
attended represented nearly a third of the planet's population.
34. According to Ghazvinian, "only about 5% of the billions and billions invested in African petroleum
projects every year is spent in Africa." GiIAZUIN1AN, supra note 16, at 14. Africa's oil boom "has produced
more jobs in the United States and Europe than it ever will in Africa." Id.
35. Id.
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The first factor is the strategic geographic location of Africa. The continent is almost
entirely surrounded by water. Consequently, the transportation costs and other related
risks are significantly reduced. African oil does not face the problems of Central Asian oil
producers. For example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Cayman pipeline is engulfed by numerous in-
tractable, logistical, and operational problems. The pipeline stretches from Azerbaijan
through Georgia and Turkey. In order to deliver Caspian crude into the Mediterranean
Sea, producers must navigate the complex Middle East politics, anti-globalization pro-
tests, and red tape before it can be opened. 36
The second attribute is that African oil faces no transportation obstacles. It is easily
loaded onto a tanker at the point of production and begins its smooth journey on the high
seas, arriving quickly at the respective ports of destination in Europe, Asia, or America. 37
The third and most important element of attraction for Africa's oil has been identified
as the quality of its oil. The variety of crude found in places like Nigeria and the Gulf of
Guinea is said to be "light" and "sweet." 3s It is low in sulfur and therefore easier and
cheaper to refine than the Middle Eastern crude, which tends to be lacking in lower hy-
drocarbons and is very "sticky." 39 American and European refineries prefer this. Other-
wise, they have to contend with strict environmental regulations that make it difficult to
refine heavier and sourer varieties of crude without high costs that make the venture
useless.
A fourth advantage is that Africa offers a more favorable, less complicated contractual
condition, at least from the point of view of the foreign oil companies. 40
Another strategic advantage to the American politician is that many oil-producing
countries of sub-Saharan Africa, except Nigeria, do not belong OPEC.41 The advantage
of non-memberhsip is that those countries are not subject to strict limits on output that
OPEC imposes on its members in an attempt to keep the price of oil high.
Next, for Western governments and oil companies, the most attractive of all the attrib-
utes of Africa's oil boom is that most of the discoveries of recent years have been made off-
shore in deepwater reserves that are often many miles from populated land. This ensures
continued production of oil even if there is an onshore outbreak of civil war or violent
insurrection. 42
Last but not least, is the speed of growth in African oil production and the fact that




39. Id. at 9.
40. Most sub-Saharan African countries operate on the basis of so-called production-sharing agreements
(PSAs). Under this kind of agreement, a foreign oil company is awarded a license to look for petroleum on the
condition that it assumes the up-front costs of exploration and production.
41. Angola became the first new member of OPEC in over thirty years in January 2007 while Gabon
withdrew from the organization in 1995. Sudan is expected to join the organization in late 2007.
42. Considering the hundreds of thousands of barrels of Nigerian crude that are lost yearly as result of
fighting, community protests, and other forms of interruption, oil companies are excited about this.
43. According to Ghazvinian, "one third of the world's new oil discoveries since the year 2000 have taken
place in Africa. Of the 8 billion barrels of new oil reserves discovered in 2001, 7 billion were found there. In
the years between 2005 and 2010, 20 percent of the world's new production capacity is expected to come
from Africa." GHAZUITAN, supra note 16, at 14.
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the conclusion that African oil is cheaper, safer, and more accessible than its competitors.
This provides an explanation for the recent scramble for oil on the continent.
VI. The Heart of the Problem
The focus of this study has been not just on the discussion of the nature and extent of
the second scramble for Africa's oil and mineral resources, but also on how the contempo-
rary, massive economic activities affect the lives of the African people. Is the second
scramble deadly or beneficial to the government and people of Africa? Undoubtedly, the
scramble has had the unfortunate effect of triggering corruption, environmental degrada-
tion 44 and human rights abuses. It is a fact that corruption on a vast scale can adversely
weaken any nation's economy, resulting in its eventual collapse. The domestic conse-
quences of the situation on the State and its people are very palpable.
In the face of these outrageous acts by foreign multinational oil companies, what should
the international legal system do? What obligations do these companies owe to the victim
State and its citizens? Are there adequate, identifiable universal standards and laws neces-
sary to regulate the conduct of such companies, particularly to stop grave abuses of funda-
mental human rights of the people? Most importantly, what measures and responses
should the African States and their leaders adopt to fully manage the negative effects of
the activities of multinational oil companies?
The big dilemma is who to believe in the whole saga of competition for the control of
the continent's oil and mineral resources. Is it those who advocate that African oil can be
useful for the economic development of the continent and at the same time serve as a
source of Western energy?45 Or, is it those who warn against selfish, runaway oil bonan-
zas that remind us only of the selfish interests of foreign extractive industries capable of
standing in the way of development? 46
VII. Conclsusion: Proposals for Dealing with the Present and Future
Effects of the Scramble for Africa's Oil and Other Resources
A. THE AFRICAN PEOPLE, NOT JUST THEIR GOVERNMENTS, MUST BE INVOLVED
IN THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THEm NATURAL
RESOURCES
The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States (the "Charter").4 7 The Charter was drafted by a Working Group
44. The present conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and southern Sudan represent clear living
consequences of environmental and social impact of companies that engage in the extraction of oil and other
mineral resources in parts of Africa.
45. See GHAZUINIAN, sspra note 16, at 15.
46. Id.
47. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281 (Dec. 12,1975). The Charter was adopted by a vote of
120 in favor, six against, and ten abstentions.
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established by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).48
It was designed to "establish or improve norms of universal application for the develop-
ment of international economic relations on a just and equitable basis."'49 Article 2 of the
Charter expressly addresses the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources
and the regulation of transnational corporations. 0 The principle of permanent sover-
eignty is contained in a number of international human rights documents focusing on two
related rights: the right of states to exercise control over their natural wealth and resources
and the right of all peoples to freely use, exploit, and dispose of their natural wealth and
resources.
5S
The people's right to exercise permanent sovereignty over their wealth and natural re-
sources has risen to the level of international customary law. Many renowned interna-
tional law scholars have assigned the right the status ofjus cogens.52 Professor Ian Brownlie
noted that the principle of permanent sovereignty is one of the rules that may have the
special status ofjus cogens.53 Article 1, paragraph 2 of the International Covenants on Civil
and Political Rights and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provides that "[a]ll peoples
may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based
upon the principle of mutual benefit and international law." 54
Along the same lines, Article 21(5) of the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights requires states "to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly
that practiced by international monopolies. 55 This article clearly separates treatment of
foreign multinationals from among all the possible exploiters, including state
governments.
Notwithstanding these provisions, some African and other developing countries con-
tinue to collude with foreign multinational companies to deprive the people of benefits
from natural resources. To make matters worse, heads of states and other high-ranking
state officials openly and fraudulently divert national wealth and resources into their pri-
vate accounts.
B. ENSURE DIMocRATIc ACCOUNTABILITY
With little or no exception, the bane of Africa's economic underdevelopment lies in its
lack of democratic accountability. One cannot succeed in holding foreign managers of the
economy responsible when their own indigenous heads of states and high-ranking officials
find themselves in power through rigged elections and without the true mandate of the
48. UNCTAD Res. 45 (Il), I Proceedings of UNCTAD Third Session, Reports and Annexes, Annex I.A.,
U.N. Pub. Sales No. E. 73.11. D.4 (1972). G.A. Resolution 3082 (XXVIII) (reaffirming the decision for the
Working Group to prepare a final draft of the Charter for consideration of the Assembly).
49. G.A. Res. 3082, para. 3, UN GAOR 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, UN Doc. A/9030 (1974).
50. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 48.
51. See Somendu K. Banerjee, The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources-An Analysis,
INDIAN J. IN'L L. 515 (1968); see also G.A. Res 523 (VI), U.N. Doc. A/2119 (Jan. 12, 1952).
52. See LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513, (3rd ed. 1979).
53. Id.
54. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at 49, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp, No. 16, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
55. Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and People's Rights, art. 21(5) (June 1981).
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people they claim and pretend to be serving. Unfortunately, the existing legal order and
cult still remain entrapped under the concepts of act of state and sovereign immunity, the
two instruments through which these corrupt officials seek to justify the plunder of na-
tional wealth and resources.5 6
C. REFORM THE CONSTITUTION TO MAKE IT MORE RESPECTFUL OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY RIGHTS OVER NATURAL RESOURCES.
The Constitution, Petroleum Act, and Land Use Act are united in the view that individ-
uals do not have ownership rights over mineral resources found on their land. Allowing
land owners to retain a portion of ownership of natural resources is an idea that deserves
serious consideration. The current compensation system simply precludes people from
reaping the benefits of resources with which they have been endowed.
D. REFORM THE JUDICIARY TO BE MORE ACCESSIBLE TO INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS
SEEKING TO ENFORCE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
It may also be worthwhile, after taking into account some of the objections to special-
ized courts in Nigeria, to consider the proposal made over the years (and most recently by
the Governor of the Central Bank) for the creation of commercial courts. This will
decongest the regular courts and ensure that cases against oil companies are speedily dis-
posed of by judges with special training in this area.
E. ENSURE THE TOOLS FOR A VIBRANT MEDIA SECTOR
Public scrutiny can have remarkable regulatory effects. To ensure such scrutiny, Africa
should pass and sign the Freedom of Information Bill.57 As former Justice of the U.S.
Supreme Court Louis Brandeis memorably remarked, "Publicity is justly commended as a
remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunshine is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman." 58 Shining the light on activities of public
officials will discourage them from engaging in certain nefarious conduct and expose them
to public demands for accountability when access is had to government records. Clean
government is possible only if the government operates openly.
56. See Kofele-Kale, supra note 5 at 261.
57. See generally Senate Passes Freedom of Information Bill, Media Rights Agenda, http://mediarights
agenda.org/index.html.
58. Louws BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933).
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TABLE ONE Status of the World's Oil
AMOUNT OF
REMAINING OIL OIL DRAINED PEAK YEAR OF
RESERVES59  TO DATE60  OIL
COUNTRY (billions of barrels) (billions of barrels) PRODUCTION61
Saudi Arabia 262 97 2008
Iraq 112 28 2017
Abu Dhabi 98 19 2011
Kuwait 96 32 2015
Iran 90 56 1974
Venezuela 78 47 1970
Russia 60 127 1987
United States 30 172 1971
Libya 29 23 1970
Nigeria 24 23 2006
China 18 30 2003
Qatar 15 7 2000
Mexico 13 31 2003
Norway 10 17 2001
Kazakhstan 9 6 2033
Algeria 9 13 1978
Brazil 8 5 1986
Canada 7 19 1973
Oman 5 7 2001
Angola 5 5 1998
Indonesia 5 20 1977
United Kingdom 5 20 1999
Ecuador 5 3 2004
India 5 6 1997
Yemen 4 2 1999
Egypt 4 9 1995
Australia 3 6 2000
Malaysia 3 6 2003
59. British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2003 9 (2005), available at http://www.bp.com/
liveassetslbp-intemet/globalbp/STAGING/lobal-assets/downloads/B/BPstatistical reviewofworld
energy-2003)print-version.pdf.
60. Association for Study of Peak Oil, World Summary, regular Oil Production, May 15, 2004, http://www.
peakoil.net/uhdsg/WORLD-SUMMARY-htm-.
61. Id.
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Argentina 3 9 1998
Syria 2 4 1995
Gabon 2 3 1996
Colombia 2 6 1999
Congo 1 2 2001
Brunei 1 3 1978






















62. See Hoover's Company Capsule Database, hoovers.com (last visited Mar. 28, 2008); Exxon Mobil,
Financial Summary, http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/files/corporate/ARfnancial2003.pdf; Chevron
Texaco, 2003 Annual Report: Financial Higbligbts http://www.chevron.com/unvestors/FinancialInformation/
AnnualReports/2003/financials; BP, http:///www.bp.com/investor-centre/info/intro.asp (last visited Mar.
28, 2008); Total, http://www.totalfinaelf.com/ho/en/profile/keyfigur/index.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
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63. From Hoover's Company Records In-depth Records, Jan. 3, 2006.
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TABLE FOUR Major Consumers of The World's Oil
2004 OIL 2004 OIL
CONSUMPTION CONSUMPTION
PER CAPITA64 PER CAPITA
(gallons/day) (gallons/day)
Belgium &
Luxembourg 3.04 France 1.38
Canada 2.92 Italy 1.37
United States 2.90 Portugal 1.35
Iceland 2.70 Germany 1.34
Netherlands 2.60 United Kingdom 1.24
South Korea 2.00 Iran 0.93
Norway 1.91 Venezuela 0.92
Republic of Ireland - 1.90 Malaysia 0.85
Hong Kong
SAR China 1.86 Turkmenistan 0.84
Australia 1.81 Czech Republic 0.83
Finland 1.81 Russian Federation 0.76
Japan 1.74 Mexico 0.76
Spain 1.63 Lithuania 0.64
New Zealand 1.62 Belarus 0.64
Taiwan 1.62 Chile 0.61
Greece 1.57 Thailand 0.60
Sweden 1.50 Hungary 0.58
Switzerland 1.50 Slovakia 0.58
Austria 1.47 Bulgaria 0.53
Denmark 1.47 Poland 0.50
South Africa 0.49 Peru 0.23
Ecuador 0.44 Indonesia 0.22
Brazil 0.43 China 0.21
Argentina 0.42 Colombia 0.21
Romania 0.40 Uzbekistan 0.19
Turkey 0.40 Philippines 0.17
Egypt 0.32 India 0.10
Algeria 0.31 Pakistan 0.08
Ukraine 0.30 Bangladesh 0.02
64. British Petroleum, Statistical Review of Word Energy 2005, 9 (2005); United Nations Population Fund,
State of World Population 2004, available at http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2004/pdf/enswpO4.pdf
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TABLE FIVE Top Oil Consumers, 2004



















Belgium & Luxembourg 779
Singapore 748
Turkey 688
65. British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2004, 9 (2004).
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66. Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Outlook 2004, Table A4 (2004).
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